INTRODUCTION
In June 2004, the Anglican Diocese of Brisbane convened a hearing before its Diocesan Tribunal to determine the guilt or innocence of Bishop Donald Shearman (aged 78) who was charged with having "committed disgraceful conduct which is/ would be productive of evil report". 1 The conduct in question referred to events alleged to have occurred in a church-run hostel in Forbes, NSW, during 1954-56 . Having found Bishop Shearman guilty of such misconduct, the Tribunal recommended that he be deposed from holy orders.
In response to the Tribunal's findings, the Archbishop of Brisbane, the Most Rev Dr Phillip Aspinall, who had the power under the Tribunal Canon 2003 (the church's disciplinary legislation) to accept, suspend or mitigate the decision recommended by the Tribunal in the exercise of his 'prerogative of mercy', 2 took the view that no mitigation of sentence was warranted. Dr Aspinall, declared (without giving reasons) that:
The positive ministry that Mr Shearman was able to exercise, as a result of his misconduct against the complainant not generally being known for so many years, is not a reason to mitigate what I accept is the appropriate response to the offence. Prior to the instigation of the Tribunal hearing, the events complained of had come to the attention of the church and had been handled at various levels. These prior efforts to resolve the issue were examined at length in 4 After reviewing all the evidence available to it, the Board concluded that the Diocese had not adequately dealt with the complaints. The Board stated that:
The subject complaint was not handled fairly, reasonably and appropriately, in that there was and remains a failure on the part of the Respondent [Bishop Shearman] to make a full and unconditional apology for his conduct towards the Complainant. 5 Hence, the Tribunal hearing was instigated by the Archbishop of Brisbane and Bishop Shearman was officially censured and punished, with the result that he is now no longer in holy orders so far as the church is concerned, as of 25 August 2004.
II ISSUES
Whilst the case against Bishop Shearman is now closed from the church's point of view, I nevertheless wish to argue that Bishop Shearman's trial by the Tribunal in the Anglican Diocese of Brisbane reveals the legal vulnerability of unrepresented accused persons before ecclesiastical courts.
It would appear from the recorded judgment of the Tribunal that the accused bishop could not afford legal representation. The Tribunal, in the early stages of its judgement, notes a letter from Bishop Shearman's solicitors to the Tribunal as saying:
Another relevant matter, again as earlier advised, the cost of legal representation before the Tribunal is beyond Mr Shearman. Mr Shearman was a priest for all of his working life and is retired at an elderly age on a modest and limited pension\stipend. 6 Bishop Shearman therefore, facing a Tribunal that had the ultimate sanction of deposing him from holy orders -a matter Archbishop Aspinall described as "the most serious step the church can take in relation to an ordained person" 7 -had no legal representation and was not even self-represented; and even if he were, he would have had to be advised as to the conduct of his case by the President (or Deputy President) of the Tribunal, which would have been a situation that was far from ideal.
The final outcome for the unrepresented accused Bishop is that he bears the odium of being found guilty of an ecclesiastical offence, the consequence of which is to suffer the ultimate penalty of being publicly deposed from holy orders. As a result of being deposed, Bishop Shearman also loses any chance of casual employment as a minister of the church, which, were it not for the fact that the Bishop is retired, would indicate that (2005) there are very few procedural safeguards protecting clergy from deprivation of their economic livelihood.
The fact that the Tribunal tolerated this situation exposed Bishop Shearman to the potential hazards that confront all legally unrepresented accused persons when they are summoned before courts and other tribunals. Bishop Shearman would, in the ordinary course of events, have been well served by having counsel representing him in order to make submissions on his behalf in determining issues (to be considered below) such as (i) the jurisdictional claims of the Tribunal; (ii) the procedural rights of the accused; (iii) whether the Tribunal ought to have afforded the accused the protections of criminal (or quasi-criminal) jurisdiction compared to the lesser standards of 'disciplinary' proceedings; (iv) whether the facts as alleged had been proved; and (v) the recommendation on the penalty to be imposed.
The trial of Bishop Shearman under the Tribunal Canon was in many respects a test case in ecclesiastical law in the Anglican Diocese of Brisbane. As such it could well have been deserving of legally aided (privately sourced from church funds) or at least pro bono support to the accused Bishop to ensure that a number of potentially legally complex issues were fully canvassed from both a prosecution and defence perspective. (Federation Press, 2001 ) 33 (viz. "some practitioners consider working at reduced fees to be part of pro bono work, others include only free services in their definition, still others account for work that is in fact in the broader public interest, for example, in the form of test cases"). "Punish our Trespasses!" An Examination of Private Tribunal Law was brought not by a 'complainant', but was brought by the Diocese itself at the instigation of the Accuser, hence the case being Robert Cunningham v Donald Shearman. The Tribunal's task was to establish whether the 'Articles of Accusation' were proved and, if so, to recommend a 'sentence' on the wrongdoer.
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At the commencement of its judgement the Tribunal noted, in the course of reciting the pre-trial formalities such as the proper serving of the Articles of Accusation upon Bishop Shearman, that Bishop Shearman could not afford legal counsel. However, nowhere in the judgment is the question raised as to the possibility that since Bishop Shearman was unable to afford legal counsel this could pose a problem so far as natural justice is concerned.
However, the Tribunal did give attention to possible impediments to the Tribunal having any jurisdiction to put Bishop Shearman on trial. The first of these was an attempt by Bishop Shearman in 2003 to resign his holy orders by presenting a deed relinquishing his holy orders to the Primate of the Anglican Church, the Most Rev. Dr Peter Carnley. Dr Carnley apparently rejected the legal efficacy of the deed.
14 Bishop Shearman subsequently attempted to resign his membership of the church by writing a letter to this effect to Archbishop Phillip Aspinall. However, the Tribunal ruled that based on Canon 76 of 1603 and a case determined by the Arches Court of Canterbury in 1845, Barnes v Shore, 15 Bishop Shearman's efforts to relinquish both his holy orders as well as his membership of the church did not deprive the Tribunal of jurisdiction to hear the case against him and to recommend a sentence.
Having asserted its jurisdiction, the question of whether it is satisfactory to proceed with a case where a person is legally unrepresented was apparently not addressed by the Tribunal. To compound matters, Bishop Shearman himself did not appear before the Tribunal and so the trial proceeded in his absence. The only legal concession made by the Tribunal to Bishop Shearman in the absence of himself or a legal representative was to enter a plea of 'not guilty' on his behalf, in accordance with s 21(6) of the Tribunal Canon.
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The charge put to the Tribunal was that Bishop Shearman committed 'disgraceful conduct which is/ would be productive of evil report'. MUNRO (2005) times in the period from the mid-1970s until the mid-1990s. 18 However, the actual events at issue would be appear to be narrowly focused on the period of 1954-56.
The Tribunal reached its verdict based on evidence that consisted of an affidavit, as well as oral evidence heard in camera, without any legal representation or cross-examination on behalf of the accused. In spite of the fact that there was no counsel representing the accused, the Tribunal expressed "no hesitation"
19 in accepting the truth of the Complainant's account of the events that were the subject of the charge. The Tribunal found, therefore, that Bishop Shearman committed "gross impropriety when he commenced kissing the complainant" 20 sometime in 1954. Thereafter, according to the Tribunal, the "sexual misconduct towards the complainant progressively escalated".
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The Tribunal, having separated out the period 1954-56 from subsequent periods in the relationship between the Complainant and Bishop Shearman, and having declared its 'guilty' verdict, turned its attention to the question of sentencing. Under the Tribunal Canon, the Tribunal has the power to recommend a range of penalties including monition, suspension, expulsion from office, deprivation of rights and emoluments, and finally, deposition from holy orders, 22 all of which are varying degrees of penalty of increasing gravity.
The Tribunal chose to invoke the ultimate penalty of deposition, citing the Anglican Diocese of Sydney case of Gerber v Ellmore (involving the deposition from holy orders of Robert Ellmore in 2001) as a precedent.
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Under the Tribunal Canon, the Archbishop has the discretion to exercise a 'prerogative of mercy' by either mitigating or suspending, or mitigating and suspending, the sentence recommended by the Tribunal. 24 The Archbishop chose instead to accept the Tribunal's recommendation and declared that there was no reason to mitigate the sentence. Bishop Shearman was therefore deposed and the Archbishop expressed his hope that this would bring closure and "healing for all who have been hurt".
25

IV
THE JURISDICTION OF THE TRIBUNAL One issue that had to be determined at the outset of the hearing was whether the Tribunal had jurisdiction to hear the case, given that Bishop Shearman had voluntarily attempted to relinquish his holy orders and then sought to resign his membership of the church. The Tribunal asserted that it retained disciplinary jurisdiction over Bishop Shearman. These Canons have generally been held to be binding on all the clergy (as distinct from laity) of the Church of England under English ecclesiastical law until and unless they are amended or repealed. Barnes v Shore is a case which invoked Canon 76 in order to foil an attempt by a Church of England clergyman, the Rev. Jas. Shore, to relinquish his holy orders so as to enable him to officiate in a dissenting chapel, contrary to his bishop's instructions.
Barnes v Shore illustrates the application of Canon 76 if it has force. 27 As far as the application of any or all of the Canons of 1603 to any given diocese in the Anglican Church of Australia there is some doubt. Apart from the fact that some of the Canons (there are one hundred and forty-one in all) are outmoded or have relevance only to English conditions, the question has occasionally been raised as to how the Canons came to be part of ecclesiastical law in Australia. Reference may be made to a Conference of Australian Bishops in 1850 which declared that the bishops were of the opinion that the Canons of 1603 "form part of the established Constitution of our Church, and are generally binding upon ourselves, and the clergy in our respective Dioceses". 28 However, the legislative competence of this Bishop's Conference in 1850 is open to question.
However, in order to remove any legal doubt, the law-making bodies of the Anglican Church of Australia, (ie its General Synod and the various diocesan synods) have, over the past decade or so, sought to amend or repeal various of the Canons of 1603 so as to make them comply with Australian conditions. However, the Appendix to The Constitution and Canons of the Diocese of Brisbane 2003 (Table 2) indicates that various Canons, including Canon 76, which up until the date of publication had not received legislative clarification or amendment, "should not be taken [by their inclusion in Table 2 ] to imply that they have any force or effect in the Diocese of Brisbane".
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The Tribunal ruled, however, that Canon 76 of 1603 did remain in operation in the Diocese. This question was resolved without hearing any submissions from counsel for Bishop Shearman. The General Synod of the Anglican Church of Australia has seen fit to pass (since the Shearman case was decided) the Holy Orders, Relinquishment and Deposition Canon 2004 which states in s 13 that:
The Canon numbered 76 of the Canons of 1603, insofar as it may have any force, shall have no operation or effect in a diocese of this Church which adopts this canon.
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The effect of the new Canon is to replace Canon 76 so as to allow clergy to relinquish their orders, but only if "the bishop is satisfied that the person is not currently the subject of any information, complaint or charge in any diocese concerning his or her conduct or fitness to hold any office". MUNRO (2005) will no longer be any doubt about any future Tribunal's jurisdiction to proceed against a member of the clergy who has attempted voluntarily to relinquish their holy orders.
Whilst it is doubtful that Bishop Shearman could have succeeded in arguing that the Tribunal lacked jurisdiction (had he wished to pursue this line of argument), nevertheless, without counsel acting for him in order to make submissions to the Tribunal, he certainly had no chance of mounting a challenge to its jurisdiction.
V THE RIGHTS OF THE ACCUSED
The Tribunal Canon provides that:
The rules of evidence prevailing and in force in the Supreme Court of Queensland, including provisions relating to judicial notice proof and admissibility contained in State or Federal Acts of Parliament shall so far as is practicable apply in a trial and for the purposes of the application of those rules and provisions a Tribunal and a trial shall be taken to be respectively a court and a legal proceeding.
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The Tribunal Canon also provides that:
The Accused may appear in person or by counsel or solicitor or (if charged with breach of Faith Ritual or Ceremonial) by a person in holy orders.
33
The Tribunal Canon also allows the right of appeal to the national church's Appellate Tribunal, which is established at the national level and constituted by a Canon of General Synod. The Brisbane Diocese's Tribunal Canon therefore prima facie goes a long way towards enshrining the principles of natural justice. 34 It has the guidance of Supreme Court rules of evidence, the right to counsel and a right of appeal. For a comprehensive treatment of the relationship between natural justice and the status of private disciplinary tribunals see J R S Forbes, Justice in Tribunals (Federation Press, 2002) . In particular, in Chapter 11 the right to counsel is discussed -"Does Natural Justice Imply a Right to Counsel?", 134-146. Forbes is mainly concerned with judicial rulings on the question of whether there can be an implied right to counsel where no such right is expressly provided for in the rules establishing a disciplinary tribunal. The Tribunal Canon of the Diocese of Brisbane, however, expressly provides such a right. 35 This compares favourably to a recently passed Canon in the Brisbane Diocese establishing a 'Professional Standards Board' which effectively replaces -without actually repealing -the Tribunal Canon as the primary vehicle for the discipline of clergy and other church workers. Not only does the newly established Board have no right of appeal from its decisions, it also dilutes the principles of natural justice by enacting the provision that:
The Board must act with fairness and according to equity, good conscience and the substantial merits of the case without regards to technicalities or legal forms and is not bound by the rules of evidence but may inform itself on any matter in such manner as it thinks fit. Clergy will be encouraged at all stages of the procedure to take advice and to attend interviews with a companion, be it a friend, a union official, or a lawyer.
37
In England there is a dedicated 'clergy section' of the MSF (Manufacturing Science Finance) Union (a union representing a wide range of workers in the services and notfor-profit sectors). In Australia there is no equivalent facility, as clergy in this country have not sought to unionise.
Of course, since in the present instance the Tribunal Canon merely provides a 'right to counsel' but with no reference to legal aid (or even encouragement of the pro bono services of a suitably qualified legal practitioner or canon lawyer, a McKenzie friend 38 or a union official), the Tribunal was acting within its canonical powers by ignoring the question of Bishop Shearman's inability to afford legal representation. Hence, so far as the position under the Tribunal Canon is concerned, it could be argued that there is no more than a mere 'right to counsel' and beyond this there is no legal or moral obligation on the part of the Tribunal to provide legal assistance to those accused before it of misconduct, nor to stay proceedings until such assistance might be arranged, either by way of privately funded legal aid, pro bono assistance or any other means.
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The plight of unrepresented persons in the secular courts is somewhat different given the safety net of publicly funded legal aid. The publicly funded legal aid system in Australia began with the high ideal, expressed in 1973 by then Senator Lionel Murphy, that:
boards and tribunals including those governing chiropractors, dental technicians, dentists, medical practitioners, nurses, pharmacists, podiatrists, psychologists and police. The ultimate object of the Government is that legal aid be readily and equally available to citizens everywhere in Australia and that aid be extended for advice and assistance of litigation as well as for litigation in all legal categories and in all courts. 40 Naturally, the then Attorney General would have had in mind only criminal and civil jurisdictions within the ordinary court system and not private tribunals such as ecclesiastical courts in the Anglican Church of Australia. (Needless to say, the implementation of such high ideals for legal aid as expressed by then Senator Murphy have over time been subjected to ever more stringent matter, merit and means tests due to increasing demands being made on the available funds). In the course of this address, Justice de Jersey expressed the view that "the concept of a court system unavailable, for reason of expense, to many of the taxpayers who fund its operation, is anathema". 43 He then addressed three broad notions: the accessibility of legal services, equality of treatment before the law, and the accessibility of the justice system. The Chief Justice said that "as to the first notion, access to legal services, one of the clearest examples of a basic requirement is that of legal representation". 44 After an examination of the pronouncements of the High Court in Dietrich v the Queen, 45 the Chief Justice stated that:
The basic requirement regarding access to a legal representative is, accordingly, that an unrepresented person charged with the commission of a serious offence would ordinarily be entitled to have his or her trial delayed until legal representation may be secured. Dietrich v the Queen (1992) 177 CLR 292. The 'Dietrich principle' -ie "in the absence of exceptional circumstances, a judge faced with an application for an adjournment or a stay by an indigent accused charged with a serious offence who, through no fault is unable to obtain legal representation, should adjourn, postpone or stay the trial until legal representation is available" (see 
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Ritualistic invocation of the presumption of innocence is mere incantation if those, entitled to its protection but unable to afford representation, are denied that representation.
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Hence:
Access to representation in a broader range of criminal and civil matters, and during some serious pre-court procedures, while not a guaranteed right, is nonetheless a basic requirement of access to justice.
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With regard to the second notion -equality of treatment before the law -the Chief Justice suggests that a self-represented litigant can pose a particular challenge for a court:
To an extent, the Judge must actively assist the self-represented litigant to ensure he or she understands the procedure and has a reasonable opportunity to present a case. Where the other party is represented, that party may, in such a case, perceive that differential treatment is being accorded. Judges are conscious of the need to be careful about this. 48 Finally, in regards to access to the legal justice system, the Chief Justice noted that:
There is throughout the legal community, a willingness to provide pro bono services. The Court of Appeal pro bono scheme is a recent entrant to the field. The Caxton Legal Centre is a long-standing, much respected contributor.
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In the much publicised case of R v Hanson; R v Ettridge de Jersey CJ also remarked that the wrongful conviction and subsequent jailing of Mrs Pauline Hanson (who was represented in her original criminal trial by a solicitor) and Mr David Ettridge (who represented himself) could have been avoided by their being represented by "experienced trial counsel". 50 Whereas the element of experienced defence counsel was lacking in the original trial, Mrs Hanson and Mr Ettridge were each represented by senior and junior counsel at the appeal stage, which no doubt made no small contribution to the success of their appeal.
VI THE TRIBUNAL AND DISCIPLINARY PROCEEDINGS
One could of course argue that the established safeguards of justice apply only to the criminal justice system (where deprivation of liberty and fines may be imposed by the state) and perhaps, in ideal circumstances, to civil litigation as well. A distinction might therefore be made between the standards of justice required in the administration of justice in the secular realm compared to requirements of justice in the ecclesiastical justice system. It could be argued, furthermore, that the ecclesiastical justice system is analogous to the disciplinary system that applies, for example, to lawyers and medical practitioners, and to many other professions as well. This is precisely the approach taken by the Tribunal in the Shearman case, which stated that "the hearing of this charge is analogous to a disciplinary proceeding".
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The Tribunal therefore adopted the civil standard of proof as defined by the High Court in Briginshaw v Briginshaw 52 , and chose to follow the precedent set in Basser v Medical Board of Victoria 53 , where O'Bryan J declared that he was satisfied that the civil standard of proof applied to "infamous conduct" cases before the Medical Board of Victoria.
By describing itself as being analogous to a 'disciplinary tribunal' one may reasonably infer that the Tribunal saw itself as being there to defend the public interest. Hence, in regard to the discipline of lawyers, for example, it is said that:
Disciplinary proceedings are considered to be protective of the public and the image of the profession and not punitive in nature. As a result, the procedures are different from the normal adversary trial and have an inquisitorial aspect. This does not mean that they are not adversarial. They are sui generis because they combine the adversarial with an inquiry rather than a hearing based on information. Similar to the admission cases there is an obligation for candour and cooperation that is foreign to the adversary system in relation to the disciplinary authorities investigating and adjudicating a case. 54 Likewise, in regards to disciplinary proceedings relating to the medical profession:
Strictly speaking, disciplinary proceedings are not really a patient complaint procedure. This is because …the purpose of the proceedings are different. They are not instituted to punish an offending health care practitioner (unlike criminal proceedings), nor to recompense the patient who has suffered harm (unlike a tortious action). Rather, their purpose is the maintenance of standards within the relevant profession. It is well established that the purpose of proceedings of this nature is not punitive but to protect the public, even though in the course of imposing discipline, some sanction in the nature of punishment may be ordered, such as a fine or suspension. This disciplinary power is protective. The true position is appropriately expressed by Kirby P and O'Keefe AJA in Richter v Walton (unreported, SC of NSW, Court of Appeal, 15 th July 1993).
The purpose of an order under s 32R of the Act is to protect the public, not to punish the practitioner. The disciplinary power is, as the High Court said in New South Wales Bar ((1968) 117 CLR 177 at 183), 'entirely protective'. In no sense is the order to be regarded as punitive or imposed to conform to notions of due punishment for the conduct which is found. Removing the name of a medical practitioner from the Medical Register is the ultimate professional sanction, in the same way as is the disbarring of a barrister. Again as the High Court has said 'when such an order is made, it is made, from the public point of view, for the protection of those who require protection, and from the professional point of view, in order that abuse of privilege may not lead to loss of privilege ' (Clyne v New South Wales Bar Association (1960) 104 CLR 186 at 201-202).
Association v Evatt
Necessarily, the exercise of a disciplinary power in respect of a professional person may have a consequence that seems punitive and that has results for the person that are burdensome and hard. But that is not their purpose in the eye of the law. In a case such as the present, punishment can be left to the application (if any) of the criminal law, to the consequences for the practitioner's practice, to any civil action that may be taken and to the shame of the publicity that has attended these proceedings. Punishment is not the purpose of the proceedings. That purpose remains, from first to last … the protection of the public who deal with medical practitioners upon the assumption of their integrity and ethical behaviour, including those who deal with this practitioner.
However, the disciplinary system under which clergy were previously to be tried for misconduct in the Church of England under the Ecclesiastical Jurisdiction Measure 1963, (the Consistory -i.e. Bishop's Court of a diocese) is defined as operating according to the criminal standard of justice, where in s 28(a) it states:
The procedure at the trial shall, so far as circumstances admit, and subject to any rules which may be prescribed, be the same as at the trial of a person by a court of assize exercising criminal jurisdiction.
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Summarising the position Halsbury's Laws of England (Halsbury) states:
The expression, "criminal suit" is used in the Ecclesiastical Jurisdiction Measure 1963 (see e.g. s. 69) with reference to proceedings in which a person is charged with an ecclesiastical offence, and the trial procedure is assimilated to that of temporal courts exercising criminal jurisdiction: cf. ss. 3, 28(a), 36(b), 45(1)(a).
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Halsbury also indicates that the power to sentence ecclesiastical wrongdoers is not so much to do with protecting the public, but to be an instruction to the soul of those who have offended. Hence:
Traditionally, the exercise of coercive jurisdiction by spiritual authority has been justified on the ground that it is for the good of the soul (see Phillimore, Ecclesiastical Law (2nd Ed) 837, 838), and it is in keeping with this principle that a bishop or archbishop is empowered to decide (after a private interview) that no further step be taken in the matter of an appropriate complaint which has been duly laid and verified: see the Ecclesiastical Jurisdiction Measure 1963, ss. 23(1)(a), 39(1)(a), 40. Ibid. (2005) Moreover, "the functions of the assessors, who must be unanimous, are the same as those of a jury in the Crown Court". 60 In the case of Bland v Archdeacon of Cheltenham the argument that the assessors in a consistory court were not a common jury "but were a select panel of experienced and intelligent persons" was rejected as being "untenable, as the assessors are bound to accept the directions of the chancellor on the law and are not entitled to form their own opinions about it".
MUNRO
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It should be noted that the adoption of the model of criminal jurisdiction contained in the Ecclesiastical Jurisdiction Measure 1963 does not depend upon the fact that the Church of England, as distinct from the Anglican Church in Australia, has 'established church' status. What it does indicate is that the Ecclesiastical Jurisdiction Measure 1963 adopted the criminal standard as the appropriate standard for ecclesiastical justice whereas in the successor legislation, the Clergy Discipline Measure 2003, the thinking has changed. It is now asserted that current 'best practice' is to be found in the less stringent procedures of disciplinary tribunals of other professions. Hence:
The newly proposed disciplinary tribunal has been crafted from best practice in the secular and professional worlds. It differs markedly, as do employment tribunals, from the Crown Court (on which the existing disciplinary court of the Church (the Consistory Court) is based). To uphold a complaint, the tribunal must be satisfied that the misconduct has taken place. In line with employment tribunals and nearly every professional body (including the police) the standard of proof will be the civil standard, (ie on the balance of probability).
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The Tribunal in the Shearman case followed precedents drawn from current Australian law relating to the disciplinary procedures of medical boards, rather than the practice of the Church of England's Ecclesiastical Jurisdiction Measure 1963. The Tribunal's approach might well have been in accordance with what may be regarded as 'best practice' both in Australian medical (and other professions) disciplinary law as well as with more recent developments within the ecclesiastical law of the Church of England.
However, the fact that the Tribunal Canon's procedures were interpreted as being analogous to a disciplinary proceeding deprived Bishop Shearman of the additional safeguards of a criminal (or quasi-criminal) trial. The standard of proof was lowered and the risk posed to the perceived fairness of the trial by the non-provision of legal counsel to assist the accused Bishop in his defence was also lowered. The raison d'etre would be that this served the public interest and that the lesser standards of procedural justice are justified on the basis of maintaining public confidence in the clerical profession. 64 -which was enacted some time after the Articles of Accusation were issued under the Tribunal Canon -then the trial would have been quite clearly a disciplinary proceeding and the Board hearing the charge could have "inform[ed] itself on any matter in such manner as it thinks fit". 65 Even if the Tribunal was correct in ruling that the Tribunal Canon ought to proceed along the lines that it did, it simply reveals that the accused Bishop had even less chance of mounting a successful defence against the charges without legal aid, pro bono support, a McKenzie friend or union official at his side than he would have had otherwise. This seems to indicate a worrying trend in the ecclesiastical justice system.
VII THE QUESTION OF PROOF
The procedural rules adopted had potential implications for the way the evidence presented to the hearing was to be evaluated. Given that the Tribunal chose to adopt the Briginshaw test rather than some other standard of proof, 66 we have only the Tribunal's assurance of its unhesitating conviction in the truth of the matters complained of 67 to compensate for the lack of any experienced legal counsel representating the accused to critically examine the evidence. The Tribunal may well have come to a correct decision on the facts of the case, but (as per Kaminski L J in McKenzie v McKenzie 68 ), one cannot be certain that the Tribunal would have reached the same conclusion had counsel been present to assist the accused in their defence.
VIII THE SENTENCE
As previously mentioned, the Tribunal chose to apply the ultimate penalty of deposition, citing the case of Gerber v Ellmore as a precedent. The conflation of the Ellmore case with the Shearman case by the Tribunal reinforces the impression that Bishop Shearman was ill served by the lack of legal counsel both during the hearing of the facts and at the stage when submissions on penalty were being heard.
The Public Defenders Office of NSW records that Robert Ellmore has been sentenced to 10 years jail on multiple child sex offences relating to children aged 12 years, 10 years and 8 years old. Ellmore is described by the Office as having "a substantial record for similar offences -breached parole…[and is a] long term paedophile". 69 It is difficult to imagine what justified the Tribunal's decision to recommend the maximum penalty to Bishop Shearman, as applied in the Ellmore case, without first considering one of the lesser penalties such as monition or suspension as being more appropriate. The Tribunal also asserted that "the passage of time does not alter the nature of the offending conduct". 70 In the Shearman case as reported by the Tribunal, the Complainant and the Bishop had a number of different periods in their lives when they had sexual relations with each other. In addition to the evidential material presented in the record of the Tribunal's decision, there is information available on the public record contained in the O'Callaghan and Briggs Report, that may (or may not) have been relevant to the Tribunal's deliberations. The Tribunal makes no effort to resolve this paradox. In contrast to the verdict of the Tribunal and the sentencing of Bishop Shearman to deposition from holy orders, Mr O'Callaghan allowed greater scope for Bishop Shearman's continuation in the ministry (even though he was not satisfied with Bishop Shearman's failure to apologise unconditionally to the Complainant), whereas the Tribunal was obviously more in tune with the more severe judgement arrived at by Professor Briggs.
The O'Callaghan and Briggs report describes at some length the attitude taken by the previous Archbishop, Dr Peter Hollingworth, in regards to the question of Bishop Shearman's fitness to continue in the ministry and the reasons for it: The Chairman whilst recognising the force of the arguments to the contrary considers that in the circumstances Dr Hollingworth in exercising his discretion not to withdraw the Permission [to officiate] was acting fairly, reasonably and appropriately. The Chairman considers that on balance the stated reasons for the decision (see para. 17.1) justified it. Put another way, the Chairman considers that this was a case in which it was open to a bishop acting reasonably to decline to withdraw the Permission.
Professor Briggs considers that once Dr Hollingworth, in his capacity as Archbishop, was apprised of the serious misconduct of the Respondent should, in order to demonstrate proper moral leadership, have withdrawn the permission. His failure to do so was in the circumstances inappropriate.
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The O'Callaghan and Briggs Report considered the case against Bishop Shearman in terms of whether it was appropriate for the previous Archbishop not to withdraw Bishop Shearman's 'permission to officiate'. The Tribunal took matters further by declaring that the very basis upon which a 'permission to officiate' might be issued (ie that the person in question be an ordained minister of the church) be revoked in the case of Bishop Shearman.
There are, however, good reasons why the deposition of 'unworthy ministers' should only be undertaken rarely. The origin of the power to depose unworthy ministers can be MUNRO (2005) system itself is theoretically committed to the principle of administering 'justice with mercy', the likelihood of mercy ever being shown will be exceedingly rare.
After the deposition from holy orders was pronounced, the deposed Bishop's wife wrote a public letter expressing the view that Bishop Shearman and herself had been abandoned by the Diocesan leaders and that "after a lifetime of service to Our Lord and His church, we no longer want to remain members of the Anglican Church of Australia".
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This unhappy circumstance may -although it is by no means certain -have been avoided if the Tribunal had be assisted by experienced legal counsel representing Bishop Shearman's interests during the examination of procedural issues, the hearing of the facts and the decision as to the penalty. Unfortunately the church failed to provide any semblance of legal aid or pro bono legal support to the accused Bishop, which leaves a question mark hanging over the case as to whether justice has been done. 
